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SEC Said Set to Make Energy Firms Reveal Payments to Governments

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Strait of Hormuz Attack Iran ‘Last Resort,’ Author Says

mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-06/strait-of-hormuz-attack-iran-last-resort-author-says.html

Venezuela Battles Flames at Largest Refinery After Deadly Blast

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Tanker Trackers Turn Bearish as IEA Trims Oil Forecast

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Exxon Joins Chevron in Weighing Argentina Shale Deals, YPF Says

mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-29/exxon-apache-to-discuss-argentina-shale-partnerships-ypf-says.html

China’s “Malacca Dilemma”
Publication: China Brief Volume: 6 Issue: 8

By: Ian Storey

Energy security, and particularly oil supply security, has become a major concern for the Chinese government over the past several years. The focus of this anxiety is the vulnerability of seaborne energy imports. At present, China lacks the naval power necessary to protect its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Beijing fears that during a national security crisis ships carrying energy resources could be interdicted by hostile naval forces. Any disruption to the free flow of energy resources into China could derail the economic growth on which the Chinese government depends to shore-up its legitimacy and pursue its great power ambitions.

China’s heavy use of the Malacca and Lombok/Makassar straits in Southeast Asia is emblematic of this concern. The Malacca Strait is a narrow and congested waterway separating Indonesia and Malaysia, with Singapore located at its southern tip. As the shortest route between the Indian and Pacific oceans, the strait is one of the world’s most important waterways. More than 60,000 vessels transit the strait each year, carrying 25 percent of global trade. The Lombok/Makassar Strait passes through the Indonesian archipelago and is used mainly by Very Large Crude Carriers. In terms of volume of oil shipped, this route is of near equivalent importance to the better known Malacca Strait.

For China, the strategic significance of these straits increases every year. At present, approximately 60 percent of China’s crude oil imports originate in the Middle East, and this figure is expected to rise to 75 percent by 2015. Oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa is shipped to the PRC via the Malacca or Lombok/Makkasar straits. Over the past few years Chinese leaders have come to view the straits, especially the Malacca Strait, as a strategic vulnerability. In November 2003 President Hu Jintao declared that “certain major powers” were bent on controlling the strait, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability. Thereafter, the Chinese press devoted considerable attention to the country’s “Malacca dilemma,” leading one newspaper to declare: “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China” (China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004).

Over the past 18 months the Malacca Strait has attracted the attention of security analysts for reasons other than China’s oil supply security. During 2003-2004 the straits witnessed an upsurge in pirate attacks. Perceived lax security in the strait engendered concerns that transnational terrorist groups might link up with pirates to disrupt maritime traffic and hence global commerce. International criticism led the littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) to step-up strait security through the establishment of coordinated air and naval patrols. As a result of these and other initiatives, the number of pirate attacks in the area declined in 2005. Yet piracy and other transnational threats in the strait remain major concerns. Due to sensitivities over sovereignty, Indonesia and Malaysia have firmly rejected the idea of external powers such as the U.S., Japan or India permanently stationing military forces in the strait. They have welcomed help from external powers, however, in the form of capacity building, intelligence exchanges, and training.

As a heavy user of the Malacca Strait, the PRC has a vested interest in the elimination of transnational threats in the waterway. Yet Beijing remains uneasy at the prospect of a greater role for external powers in securing the strait. Chinese security analysts have accused the U.S. and Japan of using the threat of terrorism as a pretext to expand their naval presence in and around the strait. The PRC has also watched with concern India’s enhanced presence in the area, especially the modernization of military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands located near the northern entrance to the Malacca Strait. Some Chinese newspaper commentaries have bordered on the paranoid. For instance, when the United States restored the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to Indonesia last year, one Chinese newspaper accused U.S.-Indonesia military cooperation as “targeting China” and aimed “at controlling China’s avenue of approach to the Pacific” (Takungpao, March 7, 2005). Nevertheless, China does not want to be left out and has offered the littoral states its assistance to improve security in the strait. At a meeting held in Jakarta in September 2005 to discuss strait security, Ju Chengzi, director general of China’s Ministry of Transportation, said the PRC government was willing to assist the littoral states with capacity building, technical support, training programs, hydrographic surveys, and navigation aids (Xinhua, September 7, 2005). More specific details have yet to be released.

Meanwhile, China is pursuing a number of options to mitigate its dependence on oil imports and reduce the country’s strategic vulnerabilities. In an effort to reduce import dependence, the PRC continues to rely on domestically produced coal for its energy needs. Beijing has also emphasized energy conservation and efficiency, the expansion of nuclear power generation, and the development of alternative and renewable energy supplies. In 2004 construction began on four Strategic Petroleum Stockpile (SPS) facilities on China’s eastern seaboard capable of stockpiling 20 to 30 days supply of oil imports. Two more are likely to be built in Guangdong province and another on Hainan Island.

New Transit Routes

As a means to reduce strategic vulnerabilities, the PRC is diversifying its sources of energy imports away from the Middle East and is considering financing transit routes that would bypass the Malacca Strait altogether. Yet all of the proposals involve significant financial outlays, technical problems, and security concerns. The most fanciful proposal thus far has been to construct a canal across the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand. The idea of an “Asian Panama Canal” linking the Andaman Sea with the Gulf of Thailand, and hence the Indian and Pacific oceans, has been around for centuries. First suggested in 1677, the idea has been revisited at least a dozen times since then. Yet on each occasion the project has been shelved due to lack of financial resources, technical difficulties and security problems. The idea was most recently revisited in 2001. Proponents envisaged a two-lane canal, an east-west highway running parallel, and harbors, oil refineries and storage facilities at each end (Bangkok Post, July 6, 2003). The canal, it was argued, would create jobs, generate revenue in the form of transit fees and oil refining, and benefit the global economy because ships could save 3-4 days sailing time by avoiding the Malacca Strait.

Initially the idea seemed to arouse great interest in the PRC. Beijing, however, baulked at the estimated $20-25 billion price tag. In 2003 the government of Thaksin Shinawatra effectively killed the project when it declared it would not provide any financial support for the proposed canal. Instead, the Thaksin government championed the Strategic Energy Land Bridge (SELB), a 150-mile underground oil pipeline across southern Thailand. At an estimated cost of $600-800 million the SELB would cost a fraction of the Kra Canal. The PRC has expressed an interest in the project, although its enthusiasm seems to have waned somewhat because of cost concerns and escalating political violence in Thailand’s southern provinces (The Nation, February 14, 2005). Moreover, the SELB would not really lessen the vulnerability of seaborne energy imports into the PRC, as tankers would still have to sail to and from Thailand, therefore merely shifting the focus of the problem slightly.

As far as China is concerned, it would be far better if oil deliveries could be made closer to home. With this in mind, Beijing is giving serious consideration to two large infrastructure projects. The first is a 750-mile pipeline from Sittwe in Burma to Kunming in Yunnan province, with an estimated cost around $2 billion (Asia Times, September 23, 2004). A Burma-China pipeline is appealing to Beijing for two reasons. First, oil tankers from the Middle East and Africa would be able to bypass the Malacca Strait by sailing directly to Sittwe. Second, the project is politically appealing given the close links between Rangoon and Beijing. Talks between the Chinese and Burmese governments on the feasibility of the project began in mid-2004. Then in December 2005 the Burmese junta signed a deal with PetroChina to supply 6.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to the PRC over a 30 year period. It was reported that the gas would be transferred to China via a pipeline to Kunming (Straits Times, February 2). If a gas pipeline is constructed, it is likely that China would also build an oil pipeline running parallel.

Another proposal is to transfer oil and gas from Pakistan into China’s Xinjiang province. This route would involve oil tankers off-loading their cargoes at the Pakistani port of Gwadar, a facility heavily financed by the PRC government (China Brief, February 15, 2005). Energy resources would then be transported by road, or more likely rail or a pipeline, to Islamabad 900 miles to the north. From there, the energy supplies would be sent a further 750 miles to Kashi (Kashgar) in Xinjiang province along the Karakoram Highway that links Pakistan with China. Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf has pushed the idea of a China-Pakistan “energy corridor” for several years now, arguing that the Pakistani economy would benefit from the construction of oil refineries and oil and gas storage and transshipment facilities, while China would gain an alternative to the Malacca Strait.

A China-Pakistan energy corridor would be an expensive proposition for Beijing given the long distances and rugged terrain involved. Gwadar’s Baluchistan province is also prone to separatist violence. At the geopolitical level, however, the proposal is attractive for two reasons. First, Gwadar is very close to the Persian Gulf and all maritime choke points save for the Strait of Hormuz would be effectively bypassed. Second, Pakistan is a close ally of the PRC. Accordingly, the Chinese leadership seems to be taking the proposal seriously. During President Musharraf’s visit to China in February 2006, the two sides agreed in principle to upgrade the Karakoram Highway. Chinese press reports speculated on the feasibility of a pipeline running alongside the upgraded highway (Shiji Jingji Baodao, February 24). China and Pakistan also signed an energy cooperation framework agreement. According to the joint statement issued at the end of Musharraf’s trip, China agreed to help Pakistan develop oil refineries, natural gas terminals, and oil and gas storage and transit facilities (Xinhua, February 24).

The solution to China’s Malacca dilemma consists of three parts: reducing import dependence through energy efficiencies and harnessing alternative sources of power, investment in the construction of pipelines that bypass the Malacca Strait, and building credible naval forces capable of securing China’s SLOCs. Each of these components is expensive, time consuming and problematic. In the meantime, China will have to contend with the dilemmas and insecurities posed by its dependence on the public goods provided by the U.S. Navy.

Chinese Oil: An Evolving Strategy

Kevin Jianjun TuCHINADIALOGUE,

APRIL 24, 2012

China’s thirst for oil and gas, fuelled by its breakneck economic growth, has been the primary driver behind efforts to forge ties with any country or regime with abundant energy resources. The conventional wisdom views Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs) as arms of the government that aggressively seek to enhance China’s energy security at the expense of other oil-consuming economies.

That view is too narrow. Chinese NOCs may be owned by the government, but they increasingly base investment decisions on market signals rather than state orders. Moreover, Chinese efforts to access oil and gas resources are helping to meet the challenge of high petroleum consumption levels and rendering the global marketplace more competitive.

In 1993, China lost its long cherished status of energy independence. The share of oil imports from the politically unstable Middle East increased from a mere 16% in 1993 to 61% in 1998, greatly concerning Chinese decision-makers. In 2002, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest oil-consuming economy. Since then, China’s net oil imports have grown at an astonishing 15% annually, reaching 254 million tonnes in 2010.
China’s dependence on imported oil increased to a record 56.5% in 2011, according to the National Energy Administration. In comparison, US dependence on imported oil fell below 50% in 2010 for the first time in more than a decade, thanks in part to the weak economy and more fuel-efficient vehicles. Making Chinese decision-makers more nervous, China began importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) in 2006 and pipeline gas in early 2010.

With rising oil consumption and increasing dependence on foreign imports, it’s no surprise that Chinese oil companies have been actively acquiring overseas assets. Chinese NOCs, along with other smaller Chinese companies, spent at least US$47.6 billion (300 billion yuan) on global oil and gas assets in 2009 and 2010, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

When Chinese NOCs first entered the already crowded global oil market in the early 1990s, they were still lightweight industry players, unable to directly compete with international oil giants at established oil-producing basins. It was no coincidence that Chinese NOCs made their first major breakthroughs in oil-producing countries with troubled relationships with western nations.

This was the case in Sudan, where China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) won the tender for the “Block 1/2/4” oil-production project in 1996. While American companies were prohibited from investing there, due to US designation of Sudan as a state supporter of terrorism in 1993, Beijing’s principle of non-intervention in other countries’ domestic issues allowed Chinese NOCs to freely pursue their business interests.

Ever since, Chinese NOCs have enjoyed a lucrative partnership with the Sudanese government. China’s oil imports from Sudan increased sharply from 270,000 tonnes in 1999 to 13 million tonnes in 2011. This major breakthrough is considered the beginning of Chinese NOCs’ active pursuit of a “going global” oil strategy.

Initially, each NOC focused on a particular segment of the petroleum industry: CNPC specialised in onshore oil and gas exploration and production, China National Petroleum & Chemical Corporation’s (Sinopec) operations centered on refining and distribution and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) concentrated on offshore exploration and production. But heavy welfare obligations to their bloated workforces, substantial revenue losses due to tightly regulated domestic oil market and relatively low crude prices in the international market limited NOCs’ financial, technological and managerial capacity.

In order to create “national champions” with the ability to compete with international oil giants, the central government reorganised most state-owned oil and gas assets in 1998, and converted CNPC and Sinopec into vertically integrated firms. The 1998 restructuring provided most Chinese NOCs with capacity to cover financial losses caused by price regulation with profits from other parts of their operations. Its results continue to be felt today.

While China’s “going global” strategy has been motivated by competition with other countries for petroleum access, it has actually helped to diversify the global supplier base, making it more competitive and ultimately benefiting all oil-consuming economies. A 2010 study by Theodore H Moran, nonresident senior associate at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, supports this assertion. Moran examined the 16 largest Chinese natural-resource procurement arrangements, and found that Chinese efforts fall predominantly into categories that help expand and diversify the global supplier system.

Moreover, as Chinese NOCs become increasingly market-oriented, a significant portion of their overseas production is ending up outside China’s borders. None of CNPC’s production in Azerbaijan and Canada flows to China, for instance. While Venezuelan officials say they shipped anything from 400,000 to 500,000 barrels of oil per day to China, customs data shows that only 150,000 barrels of Venezuelan oil arrived at Chinese ports in 2010. This wide discrepancy suggests Chinese NOCs sell most of their Venezuela-sourced oil in the open market in order to avoid the high logistic costs associated with long-haul shipping to China.

Access to advanced technology is another important consideration for Chinese oil companies looking abroad. In November 2009, CNOOC signed an agreement with Norwegian firm StatoilHydro to acquire working interests in four prospects in the Gulf of Mexico. With this deal, CNOOC has not only gained a foothold for future development in the oil-rich gulf, but also advanced its agenda of accessing state-of-the-art offshore exploration and production technologies.

Similarly, to help China’s vast shale-gas resources get off the ground, in October 2010, CNOOC purchased a one-third stake in the Eagle Ford Shale of southeastern Texas from America’s Chesapeake Energy and a 33% stake in Chesapeake blocks in Wyoming and Colorado in January 2011. Both deals provide CNOOC with access to Chesapeake’s expertise in extracting fossil fuels from hard-to-access deposits locked in shale rock.

Chinese NOCs’ increasingly market-oriented overseas investment strategy is best illustrated by their return to oil sands-rich Canada, which ranks third in the world, after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, in terms of proven oil reserves.

Frustrated with the turbulent Sino-Canadian relationship after the Canadian conservative government came into power in early 2006, Chinese NOCs withdrew their plans for direct participation in Canada’s oil sands in July 2007. This was a clear indication of Chinese NOCs’ preference for investments in politically friendly countries such as Venezuela.

But Canada’s stable political environment, established regulatory system and vast oil-sand reserves, have again made Canada attractive to Chinese NOCs, resulting in US$15 billion (94 billion yuan) worth of Chinese capital pouring into oil-sands rich Alberta alone in 2010. As the Canadian Conservative government is still in power, this change clearly suggests that NOCs’ overseas investment has become less politically – and more market – motivated.

This, however has not alleviated the concerns of the international community. Weak oversight and a lack of transparency have long plagued oil and gas projects in many parts of the world, and, with China’s rapid emergence in the global energy market, the business practices of its firms are coming under increasing scrutiny. The controversy surrounding Hong Kong-based China International Fund’s opaque operations in Angola and beyond demonstrates how overseas investment without adequate governmental oversight can negatively impact China’s national interests.

The overseas expansion of Chinese NOCs still faces challenges around transparency and reputation. And these will require joint industrial and governmental efforts to resolve.

There are signs of progress. The Chinese government has expressed support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which sets a global standard for transparency in this sector, in several international fora, notably the UN General Assembly Resolution and the G20 Pittsburgh declaration. As a result, Chinese companies have reported under the EITI framework in countries such as Gabon, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Nigeria. More of this would be welcome.

China is projected to account for about 40% of global oil demand growth by 2035, according to the IEA. China’s vast energy appetite is expected to put tremendous strain on the international petroleum supply chain. To ensure the peaceful integration of China’s rising demand with the world petroleum markets, Chinese NOCs should continue to pursue an increasingly market-oriented overseas investment strategy.

They can also work together. In the past, CNPC preferred to build integrated value chains and to be the operator of its main projects. Sinopec favored close relationships with its trading partners. And CNOOC’s strength lay in its experience with international cooperation, adoption of best practices and a world-class management team. To further improve China’s energy security, Chinese NOCs should consider strengthening their international collaboration and complementing each other’s expertise.

Finally, Beijing should continuously encourage Chinese NOCs to participate in initiatives such as the EITI. Transparent business practices will be key to alleviating the fears of other oil consuming economies in years to come.

This article originally appeared in chinadialogue.

‘Window Is Still Open” to Avoid Iran Strike, Panetta Says
By Tony Capaccio and David Lerman
August 14, 2012 4:15 PM EDT
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The “window is still open” for diplomacy to resolve the dispute with Iran over its nuclear program, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said.
Panetta’s remarks to reporters today at the Pentagon follows comments from Israeli officials that time has about run out to avert military strikes. Israel’s ambassador to the U.S., Michael Oren, wrote August 7 in the Wall Street Journal that the window of opportunity for negotiations “is now almost shut.”
Panetta said he thinks Israel hasn’t made a decision “at this time” to attack Iranian nuclear sites, and that international sanctions are increasing pressure on Iran to make concessions.
The negotiations essentially have stalled as global powers, led by the European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, await signs of movement from Iran before agreeing to a new round of high-level talks. Iran is the No. 3 oil producer in OPEC, following Saudi Arabia and Iraq, according to data for July compiled by Bloomberg.
“From our point of view, the window is still open to try to work toward a diplomatic solution,” Panetta said.
Israel’s Haaretz newspaper reported Aug. 10 that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are considering a strike on Iran before U.S. elections on Nov. 6. Iranian officials have said any attack against the country’s nuclear program would trigger retaliation. The U.S. and Israel say Iran is working toward being able to produce nuclear bombs and should give up some or all of its enrichment equipment and uranium stockpiles.
Israeli officials say there is time pressure to act because of Iran’s growing capabilities at its Fordo enrichment facility, whose location deep under a mountain near the holy city of Qom makes it difficult to destroy with the weapons. Iran is approaching within months a “zone of immunity,” Barak has said.
Army General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at the Pentagon news conference today that an Israeli strike on Iran “could delay but not destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities,” based on his review of Israel’s military arsenal.
That arsenal includes non-stealthy F-16 and F-15 fighter jets and an unspecified number of large, deep-penetrating, U.S.- supplied GBU-28, 5,000-pound bunker-buster bombs.
Panetta said in November 2011 that he “certainly shares” views expressed by predecessor Robert Gates and former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen that a bombing campaign would set Iran back three years at most.
Israeli public support for a military strike is growing as the government steps up its rhetoric on Iran.
Netanyahu said on Aug. 12 that the Iranian threat “dwarfs” all others. On the same day, Israel’s Home Front Command announced it was testing a nationwide text-messaging system to alert the public to incoming missiles.
About 46 percent of Israelis now oppose a strike on Iran without U.S. support, down from 58 percent in March, according to a poll by the Dialog Institute reported on Channel 10 on Aug. 12.
A poll in the daily Ma’ariv on Aug. 10 found that 35 percent believed that Israel should attack Iran alone if necessary, compared with 19 percent in a July 20 poll. All the polls had a margin of error of 4.5 percentage points.
Nuclear talks with Iran resumed in Istanbul in April after an interval of more than a year. The last high-level discussions involving members of the so-called P5+1 — U.K., U.S., China, Russia, France and Germany — were held in Moscow in June.
The gap remains wide, a U.S. official said Aug. 2, speaking on condition of anonymity because the talks were private. Ashton delivered a tough message to Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili, the official said by e-mail.
To contact the reporters on this story: Tony Capaccio in Washington at acapaccio@bloomberg.net; David Lerman in Washington at dlerman1@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: John Walcott at jwalcott9@bloomberg.net
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Statoil sells Mozambique license stake to Tullow
Tue Aug 14, 2012 7:07am BST

OSLO, Aug 14 (Reuters) – Norwegian oil firm Statoil has sold a 25 percent stake in its exploration license off Mozambique, which consists of two blocks, to Tullow Oil plc , it said on Tuesday.

“The farm-down reflects the attractiveness of Statoil’s acreage in Mozambique and having Tullow onboard allows us to share the geological risk while retaining a significant working interest,” the firm said in a statement.

Statoil operates the license and will hold 65 percent after the sell down while Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH) has 10 percent.

Financial details were not disclosed.

Price war launches battle for customers
Updated: 2012-08-16 02:13

By CHEN LIMIN in Beijing and HE WEI in Shanghai (China Daily)

A cut-throat price war has broken out between major e-commerce companies.
The initial battle was between two major companies, Suning Appliance and Jingdong Mall. But as hostilities erupted, other companies joined the fray.
Suning Appliance, a major electronics and appliances retailer, reduced prices sharply on Wednesday.
Meanwhile executives at rival Jingdong Mall held a strategy meeting on Wednesday, slashed prices and canceled vacations.
Suning and Jingdong “declared war” against each other earlier this week but only now are prices really falling.
But the price war now involves most major e-commerce players in China, such as Gome, another electronics and appliances retailer, and the New York Stock Exchange-listed E-Commerce China Dangdang Inc and 51buy.com, a subsidiary of Tencent Holdings.
Of the main online commerce sites, only Alibaba Group’s Tmall.com has, so far, stayed away from the price war.
Prices have been slashed, at least according to advertisements.
“Losses in the short term are inevitable,” said Liu Qiangdong, chairman of Jingdong Mall, also known as Beijing Jingdong Century Trading Co.
“As I’ve said, no matter how much money we need, our investors will say ‘yes’,” he declared, dismissing rumors that Jingdong is running out of working capital. He even boasted that the company still has more than $1 billion in cash.
Liu wrote on his micro blog that the company was willing to endure a “zero margin” for three years. He pledged that large home appliances on its website would be cheaper than those sold by either Suning or Gome.
By 7 pm on Wednesday, Gome’s e-commerce website offered 462 items with the “cheapest” prices, or items cheaper than those of rivals, according to Etao.com, a search engine for online shopping.
Qiu Lin, an Internet stock analyst at Guosen Securities in Hong Kong, said that in the long run, Suning has more firepower than Jingdong due to its fundraising capability and because brick-and-mortar stores usually show a higher profit margin.
The gross profit margin of Suning’s e-commerce website went down from 7 percent in the first quarter this year to 4 percent in the second quarter, while the company as a whole reported a profit margin of more than 10 percent.
“But home appliances are not like clothes, and consumers don’t buy repeatedly. So sales may be affected in the fourth quarter if consumer demand has been satisfied with the price wars,” Qiu said.
But stocks, in that time-honored phrase, are apparently in short supply.
Wang Zikui, just married, said she wanted to buy appliances for her new apartment and went on Jingdong’s website. She selected what she thought were goods at bargain prices but was told that they were sold out.
Dong Juan, in Shanghai, said she had a similar experience and was becoming mistrustful of various websites.
“They don’t keep enough stock. They just want to promote their own names.”
Jingdong’s Liu said the company will set up 10 home appliance warehouses this year and 25 more in 2013.
He expected the company’s total online sales to reach 63 billion yuan ($9.8 billion) this year, from 30.9 billion yuan last year.
Suning’s online platform has maintained robust growth since the first half of this year, and claims annual revenue of 20 billion yuan.
Contact the writers at chenlimin@chinadaily.com.cn and hewei@chinadaily.com.cn