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#Warfighting: Washington, Stennis Carrier Strike Groups Operate In Andaman Sea
Story Number: NNS121012-05Release Date: 10/12/2012 8:25:00 AM A A A
From U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs
ANDAMAN SEA (NNS) — The USS George Washington and USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) steamed together in the Andaman Sea Oct. 12, conducting integrated flight operations while also practicing surface and anti-submarine drills.
Located in the northeast edge of the Indian Ocean, the Andaman Sea narrows to form the Strait of Malacca, one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. Both CSGs have been conducting forward presence operations and port visits in the vital Asia-Pacific region for the past three weeks, but having two aircraft carriers operating together in the Andaman Sea is an unusual opportunity.
“The U.S. Navy routinely conducts dual-aircraft carrier operations in international waters when and where opportunities exist; however, I believe this is the first time it has been done in the Andaman Sea,” said Capt. Greg Fenton, USS George Washington’s (CVN 73) commanding officer. “These operations are vital in improving interoperability and readiness to respond across the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance to combat missions.”
The two CSGs conducted similar dual-carrier operations in late September near Guam following exercise Valiant Shield.
“Integrated operations are essential to our ability to effectively respond to any threat or crisis in the region,” said Rear Adm. Chuck Gaouette, commander of the Stennis CSG. “As the Asia-Pacific region continues to grow in importance, we must ensure we are capable of operating in a complex environment in order to continue to promote peace, cooperation and stability here.”
Consisting of more than 10,000 Sailors, 120 aircraft, four escort ships and a supply replenishment ship, both CSGs patrolled the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations over the last few weeks before conducting highly successful port visits.
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) anchored in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia Sept. 30 for a four-day port visit during which Sailors conducted numerous professional exchanges with the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) while also performing community service projects. Stennis then transited the Strait of Malacca and conducted a port visit in Phuket, Thailand. Sailors worked with the Royal Thai Navy, conducted community service events, and took some time to enjoy the local culture and cuisine.
After recently patrolling in the South China Sea, USS George Washington conducted a port visit to Port Klang, Malaysia Oct. 7. Sailors continued advancing partnerships with the RMN by practicing Explosive Ordnance Disposal team training, conducting a medical subject matter exchange, and visiting the RMN’s world class National Hydrographic Center in Port Klang.
Both aircraft carriers departed from their respective port visits in preparation for operating together in the Andaman Sea Oct. 12, the day before the U.S. Navy’s 237th birthday.
“It seems appropriate that we have two of our 11 aircraft carriers working side-by-side as we celebrate the Navy’s birthday,” said Cmdr. Shawn Mangrum, Carrier Air Wing 5 operations officer aboard the USS George Washington. “Working with another carrier air wing increases sortie generation and provides a more robust simulated threat environment and more realistic training.”
The George Washington CSG is led by Rear Adm. J. R. Haley and consists of his Carrier Strike Group 5 staff, Destroyer Squadron 15, Carrier Air Wing 5, the flagship aircraft carrier USS George Washington, the guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) and the frigate USS Vandegrift (FFG 48).
The John C. Stennis CSG is led by Rear Adm. Gaouette and consists of his Carrier Strike Group 3 staff, Destroyer Squadron 21, Carrier Air Wing 9, the flagship aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis, guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG 53) and guided-missile destroyer USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60). The group is also joined by the fast combat support ship USNS Bridge (T-AOE-10).
For more information, visit www.navy.mil, www.facebook.com/usnavy, or www.twitter.com/usnavy.
For more news from Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, visit www.navy.mil/local/c7f/.
Mahan’s Naval Strategy: China Learned It. Will America Forget It?
MARCH/APRIL 2012
Seth Cropsey and Arthur Milikh
The public debate over the federal budget often obscures the relation between our domestic and foreign interests. Such debates test democracy’s prudence by forcing a choice between immediate and easily perceptible problems and the distant and often silent strategic interests underpinning policy. An enduring strategy that enables US political and military strength through commercial superiority hinges on naval power. We appear to have forgotten the vital and unique responsibilities assigned to a navy in a democratic society: how it preserves US commercial success and domestic material well-being and—most often ignored—how a navy establishes the conditions that make liberal commerce on the seas possible.
Our greatest statesmen understand this connection. In particular, Alfred Thayer Mahan understood it. A naval officer and strategist whose 1890 book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660–1783, was a theoretical treatise as well as a history that argued for American national greatness through control of the seas, Mahan was in his time a strong influence on politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt and on a generation of foreign-policy theorists. Yet today, outside of a small circle of naval officers—including Chinese officers who admire his idea that under the right circumstances sea power is the key to national greatness—Mahan and his contribution to the American century has been largely forgotten. Notwithstanding, more than ninety percent of the world’s trade is conducted by water, and the world’s waterways are and will remain the most efficient means for transporting goods.
The two-thirds of a century since the end of World War II have encouraged us to take for granted that the oceans are safe for navigation. The US Navy has created a status quo that we now believe is natural, and we take for granted the origins of this liberal regime on the water. Should a competitor state arise to challenge America’s influence on the oceans, the world’s waterways are not likely to remain as friendly to liberal commerce as they have been since 1945. And the consequences to the American economy would be incalculable—as they were to the Dutch when they vanished as an international force in the late eighteenth century due to the loss of dominant sea power.
Related Essay
Anchors Away: American Sea Power in Dry Dock
Seth Cropsey | ESSAY
After a decade of counterinsurgency warfare, it’s hard to remember that America’s global leadership used to be—and still is—based on its naval power. But that shouldn’t excuse utterly neglecting it.
As Mahan wrote, naval power often proves “more silent than the clash of arms”—as influential as it is quiet. Yet the influence of sea power on commerce and national security is almost always pushed aside each time a nation feels domestic financial pressures. One reason this happens is that it is difficult to quantify sea power’s strategic gains, despite its silent and oft overlooked aim of creating the conditions for stable commercial relations on the world’s waterways. Contemporary economic methodology takes for granted the causes that make possible the operation of rational economic laws.
Furthermore, Mahan viewed sea power as the protector of democratic freedom. He saw three things: that Americans have a talent for creating wealth, that sea power is needed to increase that wealth by overseas trade, and that sea power assists in insinuating (on allies and enemies alike) political orders friendly to rational commerce. Like Alexander Hamilton, Mahan saw that expanding wealth would move the international system toward a commercial competition in which the US was likely to eventually gain and hold the upper hand. An additional benefit of successful commercial competition is being able to afford the most advanced military equipment, a strategy the US has continued to pursue. More than assuring the continuation of liberal commerce on the seas and securing freedom from domination by other states, sea power multiplies national power not through competition but through the soft political leverage attained through commercial development.
Nearly four years ago, the US Navy included among its important objectives humanitarian aid and disaster relief, traditional naval activities that are now receiving more attention as a core mission. More than twelve thousand sailors at a time served in support missions on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan during the height of those conflicts. But serious reductions in the fleet’s combat ability as a result of budget cuts now threaten these missions and the overall long-term strategic value of the US military. Needs that look pressing at this or that moment can slowly replace strategy.
Mahan articulated a widely neglected subject in the debate on military strategy: sea power’s special significance during times of peace. In his view, the virtue of a mobile maritime force was that it can be deployed and stationed anywhere, nearly at any time, and that its desired effect is primarily indirect and perceptible only over time.
Diverting the economic and military efforts of other states—often persuading competitors or less powerful neighbors to develop in ways guided by our own strategic interests—is most cheaply and effectively achieved by sea power. Attempting the same broad effect with ground forces is rarely practicable or desirable because it leads to charges of imperialism and possible confrontation and tends to provoke costly (to both sides) resistance. Thus, more than any other military branch, the navy, during times of peace, serves as a preventative force that may reassure friends of support, help us gain friends, and dissuade states without navies from bothering to develop them.
Similarly, by clearing the sea-lanes of hostile navies, and protecting the waters with a friendly one, a good navy encourages allies to develop commercially by providing them the routes to enter into commercial markets. Both sides thus benefit, though sometimes disproportionately. For example, how many of the Four Asian Tigers—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—would have become as wealthy as they did if they had been overshadowed by a hegemonic and threatening naval power?
Mahan foresaw that naval strategy during peace is primarily guided by the following principles. First, rather than allowing competitors to develop their own merchant shipping fleet to support their foreign trade, a great nation preempts them by the projection of sea power. Mahan argues further that a thriving commercial shipping industry is the force that naturally produces a healthy navy, not a force—like that of Kaiser Wilhelm or the Soviet Navy—that exists by whim of a monarch or the command of an autocratic regime. This insight was not implemented by the US in its maritime policies toward China, which over the past decade has acquired several of the largest shipping companies in the world. The US bet on China during Washington’s struggle with Moscow, and those who placed this bet—Henry Kissinger foremost among them—have not since reconsidered whether by seeking to offset one danger they helped to create another.
Secondly, Mahan contends that at certain times it may even be a good idea for a state to encourage its competitors to build a blue-water navy independent of a commercial fleet. Such a navy will likely have the appearance of strength, but will be short-lived and financially precarious—but all the more so if the rival simultaneously seeks to dominate on land and at sea. Looking back at the French-Dutch conflict of the seventeenth century for an example, Mahan argues that “the policy of France was constantly diverted, sometimes wisely and sometimes most foolishly, from the sea to projects of continental extension. These military efforts expended wealth: whereas a wise and consistent use of her geographical position [near the sea] would have added to it.” If Mahan were alive today, he would note that, given its geographic deadlock with India to the southwest and Russia to the north, China will most likely pursue the way of the sea.
The more subtle strategy, the one best undertaken in peace, is to secure, slowly and almost imperceptibly, territories useful for commerce, territorial management, or as preparation for the possibility of determined commercial competition or armed conflict itself. As a theorist, Mahan would have nodded approvingly at China’s efforts to develop the naval facilities and supporting bases in the Indo-Pacific region called the “string of pearls.” He observes that, “in peace [naval strategy] . . . may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got by war.” Peace for Mahan is a breather, a time when architects of foreign policy look to the direct and indirect effects of far-flung sea power in a future when gun ports are once again opened.
Thus, without spending a lot of money on stationing garrisons abroad or maintaining military bases, a navy becomes an armed chess set whose global maneuverability equals its adaptability to use force, threaten to do so, or assist states in need. Moreover, restricting or limiting a strategic rival’s access to global waters also indirectly controls their military development by forcing a choice between developing on the sea or on land. A contemporary example might be that of the Russian Federation. Even with a windfall from its oil and natural gas income, Russia cannot yet afford a competitive blue-water fleet. The United States’ global naval power pressures Russia to maintain its continental forces, to invest in sustaining ground troops, arms, and equipment. Russia’s strategic attention is directed toward energy monopoly and Central Asian territory rather than into US-dominated waters. The Russians are not competitors to the US on the sea because of American transoceanic sea power and Russia’s own internal limitations.
Liberal commerce orders relations between states through the principle of interest. But Mahan questions whether international commerce is possible without the support of global sea power, or whether, in the absence of such power, only variations of disorder, war, and piracy—or domination by a great despotic power—persist on the seas. For Mahan, a good navy is the force that establishes the grounds for liberal trade on the sea and safeguards its continuation.
If states relate to one another through either alliance or competition, as Mahan believes they do, successful commercial states follow one of three tracks: they seek to turn other states into allies by guiding them toward democratic laws through commercial pressure or military influence, as the US did in Japan and Korea; or to control the world’s waterways for the purpose of “managing” trade; or to send out colonies.
Manufacturing economies, as Mahan argues, rely on naval power to protect commerce. Service economies—such as the US is becoming—may at first glance appear to rely less and less on sea power as the need to protect the ocean-borne import and export of raw materials and finished goods decreases. But service economies in fact depend even more on sea power because of the absence of a shipping fleet, and the inevitable arrival of foreign ones.
A large merchant fleet hasn’t existed in the US since before the Civil War. But even for a nation that has replaced a manufacturing with a service economy and rented foreign hulls to carry its own goods—as the US has—the ability to hold strategic choke points, along with other advantages of sea power, such as the ability to project power and command the seas, remains critical to the order on which freedom of navigation depends. The sea routes whose safety such states have become accustomed to are at risk from new forms of rule based on new interests and different ideas of international order. When the Royal Navy abandoned its forward presence in the Western Pacific to Japan in 1904, a new order established itself there.
The multidimensional character of Mahan’s insights about sea power and the way it mirrors a changing international order helps explain the popularity he has enjoyed in China. The country’s rapidly enlarging merchant fleet and developing manufacturing economy are linked to a rising naval fleet. Mahan would have seen at once that if, at the same time that the Chinese are focusing on maritime issues, the US combat fleet’s prospects for long-term health are fading, international conflicts between the two powers will increase. Without dominant sea power, what are the choices? Land intervention—the costliest and most politically unpopular option—or a gradual decline into impotence. By cutting its naval budget, the US loses strategically, as well as commercially. And, again, our economists do not and cannot calculate the monetary losses of losing entire markets and the consequences of entering into antagonistic economic relations where competitors, not the market, set prices. The replacement of English with American naval power meant little since England and the US shared similar views of international order. The replacement of America’s dominant position as a global sea power by, for example, China, would have much more serious consequences—not just for us, but for our Asian and European allies who depend on the liberal order we have established.
Preserving command of the seas supports the United States’ competitive advantage. It allows communication with the alliances that we hope to preserve. And it gives the US strategic options. If the debt crisis the US is trying to address is resolved at the expense of command of the seas, the cure to our financial woes will prove a Pyrrhic victory.
The world’s waterways are of themselves neutral and without a preference for the state that governs them. Different states bring their own order of governing the seas, and the US brings with it liberal economics. It is difficult to imagine serious discussions of international maritime law, or treaties that establish a law of the seas, had the Soviet Union emerged victorious in the Cold War.
America’s allies in the Pacific are currently being pressed more immediately by the Chinese than we are. They see, as Americans tend not to, that the US is in a long-term competition with China, and recognize, as we don’t, that the Chinese desire slowly to push US sea power out of the international waters close to them. The only force standing in the way of such a transition, which would destroy a complex web of alliances for the US in the Pacific, is our current sea power.
Alfred Thayer Mahan offers the intellectual arguments that address what the US stands to lose economically and militarily—and all that China will gain—if there is a profound shift of power in the Western Pacific. Commerce, he believes, plays to the natural advantage of an enterprising people who are largely free to act upon their judgment and enterprising spirit. But commercial advantage and our enterprising spirit relies equally on the ability to keep open the oceanic arteries through which commerce must be able to flow. This equation is set on its head when prosperity becomes an important instrument to justify single-party rule—as in China, where freedoms of commerce are restricted by the state’s pressing requirement, for example, to employ millions; by an understanding of commercial freedom that is wholly separate from political freedom; and by a parallel view of sea power that sees the interruption of commerce as a personal threat to those who rule the state.
Mahan saw correctly that American greatness depends on dominant sea power. He understood the close connection between domestic prosperity and maritime preeminence. The acceptance of his ideas at the beginning of the twentieth century helped immeasurably in encouraging both, the condition of which is the only one in the memory of Americans alive today. But perpetual permanence is indeed the illusion of every age, as the possibility of a much diminished US Navy raised by ongoing budget negotiations should be a reminder.
Seth Cropsey is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and served as deputy under secretary of the Navy in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. Arthur Milikh studied political philosophy at the University of Chicago.
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Cracks Could Jeopardize Navy Plans to deploy LCS to Singapore
Published on April 23rd, 2012
Written by: Tamir Eshel
The U.S. Navy’ plans to base four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) in Singapore. The lead ship of the LCS class, USS Freedom is expected to embark on a 10 month demonstration deployment to the area in 2013. The US Navy is hopeful that through this first deployment to the Southeast Asian Theater it will gain essential experience relevant for the development of concept of operations (CONOPS) for the new class of ships. Singapore officials specifically asked the Navy to deploy the LCS in the island state. The Navy now has two Freedom class vessels (video) and a single Independent class LCS. Ultimately, the Navy plans to build 55 LCSs, with construction split between the Lockheed Martin team and Austal. “LCSs will be an important part of a more agile future fleet,” Navy Secretary Ray Mabus said, noting the ships will allow for substantially more LCS forward presence than the frigates, Mine Counter-Measures ships, and coastal patrol craft they will replace.
The plan was endorsed in a recent meeting between U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta and Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. According the American Forces Press Service, the defense leaders discussed the planned deployment. The joint statement said the ships will be deployed on a rotational basis and will not be based in Singapore. The deployment signals U.S. commitment to the region, and enhances the ability to train and engage with regional partners, the joint statement said. The rotational deployments will be part of the U.S.-Singapore partnership documented in the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, Pentagon spokeswoman Navy Cmdr. Leslie Hull-Ryde said. “This marks a significant movement in terms of our cooperation with Singapore,” she added. “The specific details related to this unprecedented engagement are still being discussed.”
However, a recent report aired by the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) Claims that based on the ship’s history of design and equipment failure, the LCS is simply not ready to be deployed to Singapore, or to any other destination.
Overly praising the LCS program, the U.S. Navy has been reluctant to share documents related to the vessel’s vulnerabilities with entities such as the Pentagon’s Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). But POGO has obtained documents that indicate that the Lockheed Martin’s USS Freedom (LCS-1, the first LCS ship) has been plagued by flawed designs and failed equipment. Since being commissioned, it has at least 17 known cracks, and has repeatedly been beset by engine-related failures.
During the approximately two-month deployment in 2010 when the ship traveled from Mayport, Florida to its home port in San Diego, California, there were more than 80 equipment failures on the ship. These failures were not trivial, and placed the crew of the ship in undue danger. For example, on March 6, 2010, while the ship was in the midst of counter-drug trafficking operations and reportedly “conducted four drug seizures, netting more than five tons of cocaine, detained nine suspected drug smugglers, and disabled two ‘go-fast’ drug vessels,” The Navy release did not mention that during that mission, electricity went out on the entire ship, temporarily leaving the ship adrift at sea POGO reports.
LCS 1 ‘USS Freedom’ at sea in 2008. The Freedom was the first-in-class littoral, coastal surface combatant. Photo: Lockheed Martin
Before and during the ship’s second set of rough water trials in February 2011, 17 cracks were found on the ship, according to the Navy’s Crack Monitoring Survey During Rough Water Trials Period #2. Some of these were quite serious and indicative of significant design failures. For example, a crack over 18 inches long was found at the corner of the deckhouse near a bi-metallic strip that binds the ships aluminum deckhouse and steel hull together.
Another crack was discovered “below the waterline and is currently allowing water in… When discovered there was rust washing onto the painted surface. It is thought this is rust from the exposed crack surface. It is unknown how long this crack existed prior to being discovered.
These cracks are not without their consequences. In addition to allowing water to leak into the ship, the cracks severely limit the ship’s top speed, which was previously touted as exceeding 40 knots. Last May, the LCS program manager issued near term operating guidance for LCS-1, which placed significant constraints on the ship’s Safe Operating Envelope (SOE).
According to the Near-Term Operational Guidance memo (enclosed), “there is risk associated with operating LCS 1 at the extreme edges of its SOE while transiting or deployed at significant distances from/to port (open ocean transit). Specifically, the new guidance states that in rough water the ship cannot travel at speeds greater than 20 knots. Even in calmer these faults limit the Navy’s “cheetah of the seas” to freighter speeds.
Lockheed martin responded “These reports cited by POGO are based on selective information that is more than a year old. As the lead ship in a totally new class, the USS Freedom is providing important lessons that are being incorporated into future ships, and the Navy and contractors extensively test these lead ships purposely to obtain this insight only available through usage.
USS Freedom has been certified and approved by both the Navy and the American Bureau of Shipbuilding. Solely focusing on isolated incidents on this first ship misrepresents the nearly decade of experience and knowledge Lockheed Martin now has building and maintaining these ships. Any issue that has arisen in the development, testing and usage of this lead ship has been, or will be, addressed to ensure she and future Freedom-class ships meet or exceed the Navy’s needs. And our overall LCS program remains on cost and on schedule.” Lockheed martin LCS
Willard Schoeffling
Apr 24 – 02:53
Reply
The LCS program should be stopped. Stop giving our frigates away, put missles back on them and they will get the job done at less cost. A small boat with a 50 cal. Could put a lcs out of action. The module idea will never work. This is again a program out of control. Congress looks at it as pork and the navy wants 50 hulls in the water ASAP.
BEIJING (AP) – China and Russia launched joint naval exercises Sunday that highlight warming ties between their militaries and growing cooperation in international affairs.
Chinese state broadcaster CCTV said the six days of drills feature simulated anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and search-and-rescue operations, including electronic countermeasures and other sensitive technologies.
Retired major general Yin Zhuo said it shows a high degree of trust between the sides.
“It’s an excellent exchange for China to be able to drill jointly in such sensitive areas,” Yin told CCTV.
China’s Defense Ministry said China was sending two submarines and 16 ships to take part, including destroyers, escort vessels and hospital ships. The deputy chiefs of the countries’ navies oversaw the start of drills in the northeastern Chinese port of Qingdao, the home of China’s northern fleet.
The two militaries hold frequent exchanges, despite recent disputes over Chinese copying of Russian military technology such as Sukhoi jet fighters. China was a key customer for the former Soviet arms industry, but recent technological advances at home have made it far less dependent on Russian weaponry.
Much of that cooperation takes place within the confines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a grouping of Central Asian states that seeks to check U.S. influence in the region and began holding joint drills in 2005.
Formerly Cold War rivals for leadership of the communist world, China and Russia have since found common ground in countering liberal democratizing trends across Asia and Eastern Europe and frequently vote against Western initiatives in the United Nations Security Council.
Most recently, they have united to block any U.N. actions on Syrian violence that could lead to some form of humanitarian intervention, a prospect both nations abhor.
China must have strong navy
By Yang Yi (December 2, 2011 10:28 AM)
China’s navy began a drill in West Pacific in late November. On Tuesday, China’s aircraft carrier set sail on its second trial run. The two were independent developments, for the aircraft carrier is yet to be commissioned by the navy. But some Western countries have put the two together and began chanting the “Chinese navy threat” slogan all over again.
What they have forgotten is that about 70 percent of the Earth’s oceans are international waters, and all countries have equal freedom and rights to navigate and hold military exercises there.
China is a large country with a long coastline. In the past century, the majority of invaders entered China through the seas. For a long time after the founding of New China, the country faced military threats from some big powers and thus had to concentrate its efforts on strengthening its defense on the land borders. Hence, China’s navy didn’t get the needed attention and lacked an independent strategy, acting as it was in concert with the land and air units in non-amphibious operations.
It was not until the early 1980s, when Liu Huaqing became the commander of China’s navy and proposed to work out a naval strategy and later outlined the strategy of offshore defense, that the navy began building its weaponry, holding exercises, training talents and focusing on modernization.
Nevertheless, West-led voices with the United States at the helm, have been criticizing China’s military modernization as a “negative variable” and labeling its navy’s modernization a threat to regional and international stability. This is ridiculous.
The truth is the increase in China’s military spending in recent years has its historical roots and reflects the country’s actual need. In the earlier days of reform and opening-up, China prioritized economic development. As a result, national defense didn’t get the attention it deserved and its navy lagged behind not only developed countries, but also some small- and medium-sized developing countries.
By increasing its military expenditure in recent years, China has modernized its army to a certain extent. But the armed forces have to be made stronger to safeguard China’s national security and protect all its interests. China’s navy still lags behind those of the advanced military powers such as the US by 20-30 years.
Despite all this, the West has maintained its high pitch against China as a “military threat”. The fact that the global financial crisis has created structural changes in the global strategic layout with China overtaking Japan as the world’s second largest economy and expanding its global reach, has made the West cry wolf more loudly.
The China “military threat” theory is simply much ado about nothing. China has developed closer ties with the rest of the world in the 21st century. And since its economic growth depends largely on foreign trade and supply of energy from overseas, it is essential that it develops a strong navy to protect its maritime traffic. Truth be told, the Chinese navy now is not competent enough to fulfill that historical mission.
The lack of aircraft carriers had undermined the competence of China’s navy in guarding its shipping routes. China is the only one among the five permanent members of United Nations Security Council that doesn’t have an aircraft carrier in service.
With a coastline of 18,000 kilometers and thousands of islands and shipping routes to defend, China has more than enough reason to build its own aircraft carriers, and other countries cannot direct it on the issue.
It is a common practice among countries with coastlines to conduct maritime drills. The US holds dozens of such exercises every year. Plus, it conducts joint war games with its allies. Other major naval powers, too, hold maritime exercises every year. So how come only China’s routine naval drills are seen as “threatening”?
The US has established a vast network of military bases across the world. Wherever and whenever there’s a conflict, the first question US leaders ask is where their nearest US aircraft carrier is. The US operates its warships worldwide, apparently as deterrence and to portray itself as the champion of freedom of navigation. One wonders what makes the US’ navigation justified and China’s disturbing.
The Western media allege that China’s latest naval exercise in the West Pacific reflects its stance against the deployment of American troops in and around Australia. What they fail to see is that China’s naval drill is a routine matter, based on its annual plan, aimed at improving the navy’s ocean-going ability, and not targeted against the US or Australia. When will they believe that China is not a threat to any country and has no intention of becoming one?
China will continue to conduct military drills in the West Pacific and other waters to make its navy competent enough to safeguard national security and interests, and to fulfill its international obligations.
China has been reiterating that it wants peaceful development and will continue to have a defensive defense policy. China has no designs to become an expansionist power and will never follow the West’s gunboat diplomacy.
China has been sending its navy on convoy missions in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off Somalia since 2008, and has been praised by the international community for that. Having a strong military will only help China make greater contributions to regional and international security, stability and prosperity.
The author is a rear admiral and former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University.